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VIEWPOINT
Charitable Tax Reform for the 21st Century
by Roger Colinvaux and Ray D. Madoff
Charitable organizations play a fundamental 
role in American society, fulfilling functions that 
would otherwise fall to government, providing 
creative solutions to society’s most pressing 
problems, and serving our highest ideals. The 
federal government has long provided generous 
tax incentives for charitable donations, with 
current benefits reaching up to 74 percent of the 
amount of the gift.1 Unfortunately, however, the 
design of the tax incentives is now woefully out of 
step with their purpose and the realities of 
charitable fundraising today, resulting in a system 
that is incoherent, ineffective, and on the verge of 
failure.
Taking a broad view, we believe that there are 
two overarching policy goals of the charitable tax 
incentives. The first is to promote actual charitable 
work and the second is to foster a strong culture of 
charitable giving with broad participation.
The fundamental purpose of providing 
charitable tax benefits is to support charitable 
work. If the good work of charities never gets 
done, tax benefits are wasted, costing the 
government significant revenue but providing no 
benefit to the public. In order to encourage actual 
charitable work, Congress based the giving 
incentive on donors giving up dominion and 
control of their donations. Only when donors give 
up control are funds fully available for charities to 
deploy in support of their mission.
The goal of promoting actual charitable work 
was strongly reflected in the last major legislative 
effort on charities — the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 
The act drew a distinction between organizations 
directly engaged in charitable work (like schools, 
museums, churches, and food banks) and donor-
controlled organizations that do not engage in 
charitable work but instead provide funding for 
work done by others. Congress categorized the 
first type as public charities and the second type as 
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1
These savings are possible for a gift of appreciated property in 
which the donor has a zero cost basis. The charitable deduction will save 
the donor 37 percent of the value of the gift; an additional 20 percent of 
the value of the contributed property if it is subject to capital gains taxes; 
and, if the donor is subject to estate taxes, another 17 percent (40 percent 
of the remaining 43 percent) that would otherwise be remaining in the 
estate if no gift had been made. The tax benefits can be even more if the 
property is overvalued, a recurring issue for non-publicly traded assets.
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private foundations. To encourage the availability 
of funds for current charitable work, Congress 
provided greater tax benefits for contributions to 
public charities than to private foundations. 
Further, recognizing the perils of donor-
controlled entities actually getting charitable 
work done, Congress imposed a wide array of 
rules on private foundations to make sure they 
would spend their funds for charitable use. These 
include payout rules, strict self-dealing 
restrictions, greater disclosure obligations, and 
tough anti-lobbying rules. In short, the 1969 act 
drew bright legal lines to increase the availability 
of funds for active charities and to tightly regulate 
passive, donor-controlled foundations to ensure 
their operation in the public interest.
The other goal of charitable tax incentives is to 
foster a strong culture of giving in America to 
achieve a robust and dynamic charitable sector 
reflective of our pluralistic society. Implicit in 
subsidizing donations to charity is that giving 
itself is a public good, apart from the actual work 
any particular charity does. The more people 
participate in giving, the broader the base of 
public support for the charitable sector as a whole, 
and a more dynamic and pluralistic sector results. 
If only a few voices are encouraged to support the 
charitable sector, charities will have to cater to a 
narrow set of interests and lose a main source of 
strength and legitimacy — widespread public 
support.
Today, two major developments strike at the 
heart of both policy goals and serve as a clarion 
call to update and reform the charitable tax 
benefits. First, the increase in the standard 
deduction by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has meant 
that far fewer Americans have incentives to give. 
The drop has been dramatic. In two years, the 
participation rate among taxpayers taking the 
deduction has gone from 25 percent to just 8.5 
percent.2 This dramatic change has the potential 
not only to reduce giving but also to undermine 
the legitimacy of the charitable sector as 
representing a wide swath of the public.3 We have 
already begun to see the effect of these changes on 
donation totals and in patterns of giving, which 
have become concentrated among the wealthiest 
Americans.4
Second, the growing use of donor-advised 
funds (DAFs) is undermining the basic tenet of 
the charitable tax system that tax benefits should 
be based on making funds fully available for 
charitable use. DAFs are financial accounts legally 
held by a public charity sponsor, but effectively 
controlled by donors. Donors get maximum tax 
benefits upon contribution to the DAF sponsor, 
yet funds held in DAFs are not truly available for 
charitable use until the donors release their 
advisory privileges. When donors use DAFs, 
Congress can no longer count on the public 
charity label to provide assurance that donations 
formally made to public charities are actually 
available for charitable use.
The public charity cloak of DAFs also allows 
individual donors and private foundations to 
avoid long-standing rules on payouts, disclosure, 
and lobbying, which are all designed to promote 
the public good. For example, a private 
foundation can satisfy its payout obligation by 
making a grant to a DAF, even though the money 
remains in the DAF subject to the foundation’s 
advisory privileges. The same grant also avoids 
meaningful disclosure because the money coming 
out of the foundation’s DAF will not be publicly 
sourced to the foundation — creating a new kind 
of dark money. Moreover, DAFs enable any 
individual to create his own public charity simply 
by funding it through a DAF, thereby avoiding the 
anti-lobbying, self-dealing, and disclosure rules 
otherwise applicable to organizations financed by 
a small number of funders. The ability to opt out 
of private foundation status at will makes a 
mockery of our tax system and the complex 
statutory rules providing different treatment for 
private foundations and public charities.
2
James Andreoni and Jon Durnford, “Lost Your Charitable 
Deduction in 2018? You Are Not Alone,” in “The Effects of the 2017 Tax 
Reform on Itemization and the Charitable Deduction” (July 15, 2019). 
The participation rate is not the same as the percentage of itemizers, 
which dropped from 30 percent to 10 percent. Id. The rates of 25 percent 
and 8.5 percent reflect itemizers who claimed the charitable deduction.
3
For a discussion of some of the effects, see Roger Colinvaux, “The 
Importance of a Participatory Charitable Giving Incentive,” Tax Notes, 
Jan. 30, 2017, p. 605.
4
Emily Haynes and Michael Theis, “Gifts to Charity Dropped 1.7% 
Last Year, Says ‘Giving USA,’” The Chronicle of Philanthropy, June 18, 
2019.
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To summarize our concerns, the system of 
charitable tax benefits is failing on three main 
fronts: (1) current rules provide no giving 
incentive for 90 percent of American taxpayers, 
leaving charities reliant on a shrinking and 
narrow base of support; (2) current rules no 
longer provide any assurance that tax-benefited 
donations will ever be made available for 
charitable use; and (3) long-standing rules 
designed to promote the public good (for 
example, on payout, disclosure, and lobbying) are 
easy to avoid through the use of DAFs.
Both of us have written numerous articles and 
opinion pieces on ways to improve the tax rules to 
make them fairer and work better for the people 
who rely on charitable efforts,5 and there are 
many ways to approach these complex issues. In 
this article, we outline five proposals that we 
believe provide the best ways to fix the problems 
facing the charitable sector:
1. replace the current charitable deduction 
with a credit for charitable giving available 
for all taxpayers who give more than a 
designated floor;
2. reform the rules applicable to DAFs so that 
some tax benefits are conferred upon 
transfer to a DAF while others are deferred 
until the donation is no longer subject to 
the donor’s advisory privileges;
3. reform private foundation payout rules to 
close the loophole that allows a charity to 
avoid private foundation status by 
funding the charity through a DAF;
4. prohibit private foundations from 
counting a grant to a DAF as satisfying 
their 5 percent payout requirement, 
require disclosure of foundation to DAF 
grants, and bar foundations from counting 
payments to insiders (such as travel and 
compensation) as payments for charitable 
purposes; and
5. reform the excise tax applicable to private 
foundations to provide incentives for them 
to increase their charitable expenditures.
Expand Availability of Charitable Tax Benefits
The charitable deduction has long been 
criticized as unfair. As a deduction, the value of 
the tax benefit increases with income. The higher 
the marginal rate of the donor, the larger the tax 
benefit, meaning that the wealthier the taxpayer, 
the less they must pay for each dollar of their 
charitable gifts. Thus, for a gift of $1,000, a 
taxpayer in the 37 percent bracket gets $370 in tax 
savings while a taxpayer in the 15 percent bracket 
gets just $150 — a $220 difference in the size of the 
tax benefit for the same gift. In addition, as an 
itemized deduction, only a small fraction of 
taxpayers actually have a tax incentive to give, 
further increasing unfairness. Thus, millionaires 
can get a return of 37 percent on their charitable 
contributions, while a middle-income taxpayer 
who claims the standard deduction gets no tax 
benefit at all for a contribution of the same 
amount. Such middle-income taxpayers thus have 
no incentive to give, and when they do, their gift 
is not acknowledged by the tax system even 
though their sacrifice is likely greater relative to 
their wealth.
These problems have been exacerbated by the 
TCJA’s extraordinary increase to the standard 
deduction. By reducing the number of itemizers 
by two-thirds, just over 10 percent of taxpayers 
are now eligible to claim the charitable deduction. 
This will in all likelihood get worse as taxpayers 
understand they can no longer claim a deduction 
for their gifts.6 Further, with only the wealthiest in 
society claiming charitable tax benefits, the 
charitable sector will become less pluralistic and 
more reflective of the interests of the donor class.7 
This is of great concern. A main strength of the 
charitable sector is widespread public support 
that is fostered by tax incentives. Although it is 
5
See, e.g., Colinvaux, “Fixing Philanthropy: A Vision for Charitable 
Giving and Reform,” Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2019, p. 1007; Colinvaux, “Donor 
Advised Funds: Charitable Spending Vehicles for 21st Century 
Philanthropy,” 92 Wash. L. Rev. 39 (2017); Ray D. Madoff, “When Is 
Philanthropy? How the Tax Code’s Answer to This Question Has Given 
Rise to the Growth of Donor-Advised Funds and Why It’s a Problem,” in 
Philanthropy in Democratic Societies 158-177 (2016); and Madoff and Lewis 
B. Cullman, “The Undermining of American Charity,” The New York 
Review of Books, 17-18 (July 14, 2016). Madoff, “5 Myths About Payout 
Rules for Donor-Advised Funds,” The Chronicle of Philanthropy, Jan. 13, 
2014.
6
Although causation is always difficult to prove, the most recent 
statistics — showing a significant drop in charitable giving in the wake 
of the TCJA — seems to be evidence of this decline. Andreoni and 
Durnford, supra note 2, at 5.
7
A related concern is that nonprofits increasingly will opt out of 
charitable status altogether and become more privately focused, and 
even political, organizations. For additional discussion, see Colinvaux, 
supra note 3.
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true that the base of support historically has been 
tied to taxpayers who itemize (and thus to higher-
income taxpayers), before 2017 that base still 
amounted to roughly 30 percent of taxpayers — a 
significant (and changing) segment of the 
population. With only the wealthiest of the 
wealthy among us now likely ever to claim a 
charitable deduction, the fundamental public 
character of charities is under threat.
Accordingly, to address the increased inequity 
of the tax incentive and the danger to the sector 
from increasingly narrow taxpayer participation, 
we believe it is time to make the charitable giving 
incentive available to all taxpayers by replacing 
the deduction with a credit. A uniform credit 
percentage, applicable to all, would provide a fair 
and more transparent tax benefit. A gift of $1,000 
would provide the same benefit, regardless of the 
income level of the donor. To reduce the cost of the 
expanded incentive, only gifts above a designated 
floor would receive the tax benefit. A floor would 
reduce the inefficiency of the current incentive, 
which rewards each dollar of charitable giving, 
but retain the incentive to give when it can have 
the most impact: the point at which donors 
actually need an incentive to give more. A floor 
would also reduce administrative costs and tax 
evasion. In sum, a tax credit for the charitable 
giving of all taxpayers, subject to a floor, would be 
an important step in favor of fairness, 
transparency, and efficiency and would promote a 
more robust charitable sector that reflects the 
interests of all Americans.
Reform Tax Rules Applicable to DAFs
DAFs have grown from obscurity to 
dominance in charitable giving. In 2017 (the most 
recent year for which data are available), Fidelity 
Charitable was the largest charitable fundraiser in 
the United States, raising $6.83 billion, more than 
twice as much as United Way.8 In 2017 the top four 
DAF sponsors raised more than the top 10 non-
DAF public charities combined.9
DAFs are popular because they provide 
donors with the double benefit of (1) effective 
ongoing control over donated funds, and (2) tax 
benefits that can be far greater than would be 
achieved by donating to a private foundation.
DAFs can be confusing because there is a 
disconnect between their legal structure and how 
they operate in practice. Legally, when a donor 
transfers property to a DAF sponsoring 
organization, the transfer is just like an outright 
transfer to the Red Cross or a local food bank. The 
donor technically gives up all control over the 
donated property, including the right to direct 
charitable transfers of the donated funds. In legal 
parlance, the gift is considered complete because 
the donor formally relinquishes dominion and 
control over the property, thus enabling donors to 
obtain full tax benefits for their transfer. But in 
fact, despite the formal transfer of ownership 
from the donor to the sponsoring charity, the 
nature of the DAF is that the sponsoring charity 
effectively allows the donor to retain ongoing 
control over the charitable disposition and 
investment of the donated assets.10 That ongoing 
control is the reason why donors make 
contributions to DAFs instead of making outright 
non-DAF gifts to charities.
Because a donor to a DAF can give away 
property while also retaining effective control, the 
transferred property is functionally “between 
ownership.” The donor has committed the 
property to eventual charitable use and so can no 
longer use the property to buy a yacht or for other 
personal consumption, but the donor’s ongoing 
advisory privileges prevent the property from 
being truly available for use by any particular 
charity. Moreover, under our current system 
donors are under no obligation, and have no 
incentive, ever to release their advisory privileges 
to make the funds available for charitable use. The 
problem is that DAFs effectively sever the link 
8
Drew Lindsay, “America’s Favorite Charities 2018,” The Chronicle of 




These ongoing advisory privileges are built into section 4966(d)(2), 
which defines a DAF as (1) a fund or account owned and controlled by a 
sponsoring organization (2) that is separately identified by reference to 
contributions of the donor or donors, and (3) the donor (or a person 
appointed or designated by the donor) has or reasonably expects to have 
advisory privileges over the distribution or investments of the assets.
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between the granting of charitable tax benefits 
and the provision of benefits to charities.11
Given the current popularity and dominance 
of DAFs in the charitable fundraising world, it is 
easy to forget the controversy that surrounded 
their emergence and the conditions for their 
acceptance. At the heart of the conflict was how to 
characterize the DAF and the nature of donor 
advice. If a DAF was a “donor-directed” fund, 
whereby the donor could tell the sponsor how to 
spend the money, no deduction would be allowed 
because of retained control by the donor. But if a 
donor’s role was truly advisory in nature, 
whereby donors could offer suggestions and 
guidance but not direct the distributions, a 
deduction would be allowed. The IRS cautiously 
accepted industry arguments that donors to DAFs 
would not be allowed to direct distributions, and 
on that basis allowed contributions to DAFs to 
qualify for current charitable tax benefits.12 We 
believe, however, that competition for funds 
among DAF sponsors has made the distinction 
between direction and advice formalistic and 
without substance. Nobody transfers property to 
a commercial DAF sponsor so that the sponsor 
can make distributions on its own from the 
donor’s DAF. Sponsors know that if they were to 
exert significant control over DAF funds, the 
“adviser” could simply “advise” that the funds be 
transferred to another, more compliant, DAF 
sponsor.13 As a result, DAFs are operated for all 
intents and purposes at the donor’s direction.
Accordingly, we believe that to reflect the 
reality of DAFs, current law should be revised to 
restore the connection between the timing of the 
charitable deduction and the availability of 
donated funds for charitable use. We propose that 
donors be given the estate and gift tax and capital 
gains tax advantages when transferring funds to a 
DAF (reflecting that DAF funds are no longer 
available for personal use), but that the income tax 
deduction be suspended until the funds are no 
longer subject to advisory privileges and 
therefore are available for charitable use.14 Once a 
distribution from a DAF to a qualified charity 
occurs (and advisory privileges are released), the 
donor (if alive) would be allowed a charitable 
deduction equal to the amount of the distribution. 
Under this new rule, donors to DAFs would have 
an incentive (the income tax deduction) to make 
DAF funds fully available for charitable use by 
making distributions from the DAF or releasing 
advisory privileges. A donor may decide to wait 
and accumulate funds tax free in a DAF before 
distribution, in which case the charitable 
deduction will also be postponed until the donor 
is prepared to make a decision.
By returning the timing of the deduction to 
the point at which a charity has effective use of the 
donated funds, this change would promote the 
purpose of the charitable deduction — to provide 
funds for charitable use. Further, a deferred 
deduction rule also ties the amount of the 
deduction to the amount of cash ultimately made 
available for charitable use. This has important 
additional policy benefits, largely regarding 
donations of property.
Among the main sources of DAF 
contributions are property, including publicly and 
privately traded stock, real estate, and a wide 
variety of other items (for example, limited 
liability company interests, cryptocurrency, and 
grain).15 This is because donors get significantly 
11
There are many reasons why well-meaning donors may fail to 
make significant distributions from their DAFs, including that (1) 
charitable decisions are difficult and many donors have busy lives and 
want to defer decision-making; (2) as noted by behavioral economists, 
donors can feel good watching their DAF accounts grow (similar to 
people’s feelings about retirement funds) and may experience a sense of 
loss when their DAF accounts decrease as a result of charitable 
distributions; and (3) DAF sponsors and financial advisers benefit 
financially when assets remain in the DAF, which may cause them to 
subtly encourage donors to think of DAFs as accounts to hold rather 
than as funds to disburse (e.g., by encouraging donors to think of DAF 
funds as a charitable legacy to be passed on to younger generations).
12
Concerned about donors abusing DAFs for personal benefit, 
Congress in 2006 defined a DAF in terms of donor advisory privileges 
and required a formal acknowledgment by DAF sponsors of their 
independent ownership of donated sums. An unintended consequence 
of codifying the DAF, however, has been largely to mute arguments by 
the IRS that gifts to a DAF sponsor are not complete.
13
This might explain why The Economist found that the largest 
recipient of donations from DAFs sponsored by Fidelity Charitable, 
Schwab Charitable, and Vanguard Charitable was Fidelity Charitable.
14
We have both argued previously for a change to the law that would 
impose a payout term on DAFs. Although we continue to believe that a 
strong payout rule would be a great improvement over current law, we 
also think our current proposal (suspending the deduction until 
advisory privileges are released) is a better solution because it more 
accurately captures the economic realities of DAFs and avoids the 
valuation problems associated with contributions of complex assets.
15
For example, Fidelity Charitable in 2015 reported receiving $2.95 
billion in noncash contributions. See generally David Gelles, “How Tech 
Billionaires Hack Their Taxes With a Philanthropic Loophole,” The New 
York Times, Aug. 3, 2018 (discussing ways that donors use DAFs for in-
kind property contributions). DAF sponsors pepper their advertising 
with solicitations for complex assets. See, e.g., Susan B. Garland, “How to 
Donate Complex Assets,” Kiplinger (Mar. 2015).
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more tax benefits by making contributions of 
appreciated property instead of cash and DAF 
sponsors are eager to act as brokers to liquidate 
the property. Although a contribution of cash can 
save the donor as much as 37 cents for each dollar 
donated, a contribution of appreciated property 
can save the donor 57 cents for each dollar 
donated (taking into account both capital gains 
taxes and income taxes but not potential estate 
taxes). Moreover, DAFs are especially attractive 
for contributions of property other than publicly 
traded stock (the industry refers to these as 
complex assets) because if those assets are 
donated to a private foundation, the donor’s 
deduction is limited to basis. By donating 
complex assets to a DAF, the donor can claim a 
deduction based on the appraised fair market 
value of the property at the time of gift.
Appraisals, however, are difficult to perform 
accurately and can result in overvaluation of the 
property, as well as excess (if not fraudulent) 
deductions. Valuation is more an art than a 
science and there is often a considerable range of 
defensible values for property that does not have 
a ready market. Being dependent on donors for 
their fees, appraisers feel a natural pressure to 
come up with higher values that will afford 
donors better tax savings. Moreover, because of 
the expense and difficulty of valuing property 
that has no ready market value, it is virtually 
impossible for the IRS to provide sufficient 
oversight on valuation of those types of interests, 
particularly when taking into account the 
explosion of contributions that has occurred with 
the rise of DAFs.16
Further, the current-law deduction for the 
value of the appraised property, even when 
accurate, allows donors to claim a tax benefit for 
funds that will be spent on the preservation and 
conversion of the asset to cash, rather than on the 
amount of funds that are available for distribution 
to charity. This means that a donor’s deduction is 
likely to be greater than the amount that ends up 
being available for distribution. Depending on the 
time that it takes to sell the property and the 
expenses associated with the sale, there can be a 
significant gap between those two numbers.17
Delaying the deduction until the actual 
distribution of cash avoids the need for 
appraisals18 and bases the deduction on the net 
benefit to charity, thus solving two of the principal 
problems with DAF property donations: the 
uncertainty and administrative cost associated 
with appraisals, and the facilitation of deductions 
greater than the amount available for charitable 
use. Importantly, our proposal would allow 
donors a deduction based on the distributed 
amount, whether the value increases or decreases 
from the time of the donation. Donors could then 
reap the benefits if the property (including cash 
invested after donation) increases in value over 
time.
End Use of DAFs to Create Phony Public Charities
As noted previously, Congress in 1969 created 
a clear division in charity law between public 
charities and private foundations. Public charities 
would be more lightly regulated than private 
foundations and treated better for purposes of the 
charitable deduction. The reasons were to 
recognize the fundamental purpose of the 
charitable deduction to increase the availability of 
funds for charitable use, and the concern that 
private foundations were more prone to abuse 
given the opportunity for ongoing donor control.
One way the law categorizes organizations as 
public or private is based on their sources of 
support. If an organization is funded by a small 
number of individuals, it is a private foundation. 
Alternatively, if an organization can show that it 
gets a lot of support from a variety of donors, it 
16
The many problems associated with donations of property (not just 
with DAFs) has led one of us to question whether we should allow 
charitable deductions for contributions of property (see Colinvaux, 
“Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined,” 
50(263) Harv. J. on Legis. (2013)) and, if deductions are allowed, whether 
the amount of the deduction should be reduced to account for some of 
the deducted appreciation (see Colinvaux, “Donor Advised Funds,” 
supra note 5).
17
Consider the case of a donor that has a condominium in an area 
where the market is currently depressed. Assume the condominium has 
an appraised value of $500,000. After donation, the DAF sponsor may 
have to pay significant fees associated with the property, such as 
property taxes, utilities, and condominium fees, and the eventual sale of 
the property will require payment of transfer taxes and real estate 
brokerage fees. After all these expenses are paid, only $400,000 is 
allocated to the donor’s DAF even though the donor was allowed to take 
a tax deduction based on a $500,000 appraised value. See Madoff, “Three 
Simple Steps to Protect Charities and American Taxpayers From the Rise 
of Donor-Advised Funds,” Nonprofit Quarterly, July 25, 2018.
18
Our proposal would base the amount of the deduction on the 
amount of cash distributed from the DAF. If the DAF distributes noncash 
property, the deduction would be zero.
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passes the public support test and qualifies as a 
charity. In meeting this test, contributions from 
existing public charities count as public support. 
This rule has created the opportunity for 
individuals to create their own public charities 
simply by making their donations through DAFs.
Treasury has become concerned about this use 
of DAFs to create phony public charities by 
disguising the source of an organization’s 
support.19 With public status, the charity can 
avoid foundation restrictions on lobbying, self-
dealing, and public disclosure of donors. The ploy 
is easy to execute: a donor contributes to a DAF 
and funds a new (or existing) charity from the 
DAF instead of directly. Because the DAF 
contribution technically is a contribution from a 
public charity (and not from the donor-adviser), 
the DAF contribution automatically counts as 
public support. By contrast, if the contribution is 
sourced to the individual donor-adviser, only 
some of the support would be regarded as public 
and the charity would need to show contributions 
from many other donors to avoid being treated as 
a private foundation.20
The potential for abuse is considerable, 
particularly when it comes to lobbying. Although 
private foundations are generally prohibited from 
lobbying,21 public charities can (with some 
limitations) spend up to $1 million a year on 
lobbying without penalty. If a donor wants to 
lobby with tax-deductible funds, one way to do so 
is to fund a DAF with a large contribution (say $20 
million) and advise a $20 million grant to New 
Charity created by the donor. New Charity 
automatically qualifies as a public charity under 
the support test because all its support is from a 
public charity (the DAF sponsor). As a public 
charity, New Charity makes an election under the 
tax law (a section 501(h) election), which may 
allow it to spend $1 million on lobbying 
depending on its budget and expenses. New 
Charity for the year spends $1 million on lobbying 
and, to show that it has a charitable function, $19 
million in a grant to a DAF, where it is ready to be 
deployed to a new New Charity. The same pattern 
can recur innumerably, with the $19 million grant 
money being used over and over to establish a 
base for the lobbying activity.
Other similar abuses are possible. One widely 
reported use of a DAF to avoid private foundation 
status involved former acting Attorney General 
Matthew Whitaker. Before his appointment, 
Whitaker was well compensated as the head of a 
new charity that spent much of its money 
attacking Hillary Clinton. The charity was funded 
entirely by a DAF. Had the organization been a 
private foundation, the public would have known 
the source of Whitaker’s support, but as a public 
charity the paper trail reveals only that the donor 
is a DAF.22
Questionable uses like these of public 
charities not only skirt the law but also cause 
serious harm to the reputation of the charitable 
sector. We agree with the Treasury Department 
that a common-sense approach would be to 
provide that contributions of DAF assets do not 
count as support from a public charity.23
Close Payout Loophole for Private Foundations
In 1969 Congress became concerned that 
private foundations were providing too many tax 
benefits to donors without any assurances that 
donated funds would benefit the public in a 
timely manner. As a result, it enacted a rule that 
required private foundations to distribute 
roughly 5 percent of their assets each year to 
public charities.24 Sensibly, the payout rule could 
not be evaded by a private foundation making 
distributions to other private foundations, 
because the funds would simply await further 
distribution by that foundation.
Since the rise of DAFs, some private 
foundations have been meeting their payout 
19
Notice 2017-73, 2017-51 IRB 562.
20
Under reg. section 1.170A-9(f)(6)(i), support from any one 
individual counts as public support only to the extent that it does not 
exceed 2 percent of the organization’s total support.
21
This prohibition is created through section 4945(d)(2) by imposing 
an excise tax on all lobbying activities.
22
Madoff, “We Don’t Know Who Was Paying Matthew Whitaker, and 
That’s a Problem,” The Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2018.
23
Treasury proposes a similar approach in Notice 2017-73.
24
Qualifying distributions also include funds spent directly for 
charitable purposes.
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requirements by making grants to DAFs that are 
established by the foundation.25 The foundation 
can then advise distribution of the grant from the 
DAF to an active charity at a later date. This can 
have multiple benefits for the foundation: the 
transfer counts for purposes of the foundation’s 
payout (because the DAF sponsor is a public 
charity), and the foundation can disguise the 
source of the funding by flowing the funds 
through a DAF.
Neither of these benefits is consistent with the 
spirit of the rules that have governed private 
foundation conduct since 1969. The payout is 
intended to measure distributions to active 
charities, not to other investment funds. 
Moreover, because of the potential for abuse, 
foundations are held to higher standards of 
transparency. Allowing foundation-to-DAF 
transfers to count for payout purposes is 
inconsistent with the policies behind the private 
foundation payout and disclosure rules.
To address these concerns, we believe 
Congress should provide that foundation-to-DAF 
transfers are not qualifying distributions for 
purposes of a private foundation’s payout 
requirement. Further, to the extent foundations 
continue to fund causes through DAFs, sponsors 
should have to publicly disclose the foundation 
donors on grants from the foundation-advised 
DAFs. If Congress wants to preserve the use of 
DAFs for private foundations (to allow them to 
pool resources with other foundations), it should 
require contributions from private foundations in 
satisfaction of payouts to be distributed within 15 
months of contribution. This is similar to the rule 
applicable to distributions from a private 
foundation to another private foundation.26
Further, Congress should also close the 
loophole that allows private foundations to meet 
their 5 percent payout requirement by paying 
compensation and travel expenses for family 
members. Under current law, a foundation paying 
family insiders compensation or reimbursing 
their travel costs is treated the same as if the 
foundation made a grant to a public charity 
performing actual charitable work. This is wrong. 
Allowing family compensation and travel to be 
treated as charitable creates an incentive for 
family members who control the foundation to 
spend money on themselves for their personal 
benefit and convenience, and to reduce 
distributions to public charities. Setting aside 
whether it is appropriate for foundations to pay 
for the reasonable compensation and foundation-
related travel of family members, those expenses 
should not be equated with a payment for the 
benefit of an independent charity. Accordingly, 
we believe the definition of a qualifying 
distribution should be changed to exclude any 
payment for the benefit of a foundation donor (or 
related party) that is related to compensation or 
travel.
Amend Excise Tax to Spur Foundation Grants
Under current law, private foundations 
generally are subject to a 2 percent excise tax on 
their investment income. However, if a private 
foundation increases its annual distribution over 
its historic distribution rate, the excise tax is 
reduced to 1 percent for that year. This two-tiered 
system was intended to reward private 
foundations that make progressively larger 
grants.
Private foundations have long sought to 
repeal the two-tiered excise tax in favor of a single 
1 percent excise tax.27 Their argument is that the 
two-tiered system is complicated and, 
paradoxically, can sometimes discourage large 
distributions because it can make it harder for the 
private foundation to qualify for the lower excise 
tax rate in subsequent years.
Although those arguments have merit, we 
believe that there is a better solution that 
simplifies the excise tax and fixes the design flaw, 
while still providing an incentive for private 
foundations to increase their distributions. To that 
end, Congress could provide that private 
foundations are subject to a 2 percent excise tax 
but the tax will be reduced to 1 percent for any 
year in which their qualifying distributions are 6 
percent or greater. The tax could be reduced 
25
The Economist found that some private foundations distribute 90 
percent of their qualifying distributions to DAFs. “A Philanthropic 




See e.g., H.R. 2386, Private Foundation Excise Tax Simplification Act 
of 2017 (115th Cong.).
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further to zero when qualifying distributions are 
at least 8 percent. A mechanism like this would 
simplify the excise tax while retaining an 
incentive in the tax code for private foundations to 
make qualifying distributions above the statutory 
minimum of 5 percent, which has often served as 
a ceiling on private foundation annual grant-
making.
Conclusion
The charitable sector is in peril. Too few 
taxpayers have incentives to participate in 
charitable giving, and too many donors can claim 
tax benefits without truly relinquishing control of 
their donations to an independent charity. On our 
current path, the result will be a charitable sector 
that reflects the voices of the wealthiest donors, 
and where working charities are starved for 
resources waiting for foundations and DAF 
advisers to release their funds. Fortunately, 
solutions are at hand: Expanding the incentive to 
all taxpayers in the form of a credit (subject to a 
giving floor), suspending the income tax 
deduction to DAF sponsors until the contribution 
is released from advisory privileges, closing 
loopholes that enable foundations and donors to 
skirt long-standing legal requirements, and 
modifying incentives to foundations to foster 
more spending will restore sanity and legitimacy 
to the law and establish a strong platform for our 
21st-century charitable sector. 
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